

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

ACDE-00 /026 W

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P R 051651Z SEP 75

FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2771

INFO USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 339

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DRAFT NAC STATEMENT FOR SEPTEMBER 12 CONSULTATION (SALT TWO-772)

REF: (A) USNATO 4600, (B) STATE 205856

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF PROPOSED STATEMENT TO NAC FOR MY SEPTEMBER 12 CONSULTATION THERE. REQUEST WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE AND OR COMMENTS. IF THERE ARE ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NOW AND SEPTEMBER 12 I WILL MAKE ANY AMENDMENTS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DRAFT STATEMENT
BY
AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, SEPTEMBER 12, 1975

I AM PLEASED TO MEET WITH YOU AGAIN TO CONTINUE OUR REGULAR
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CONSULTATIONS ON SALT. WHILE WE ARE STILL SOME DISTANCE FROM

FINAL AGREEMENT, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON JULY 2 WHICH I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU. I AM PLEASED TO NOTE THAT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING OUR MEETING, THERE WILL BE AN EXPERTS' MEETING. THE U.S. WILL BE REPRESENTED BY MR. RALPH EARLE II, A MEMBER OF THE U.S. SALT DELEGATION, WHO I BELIEVE IS WELL KNOWN TO MOST OF YOU.

AT OUR LAST MEETING HERE ON MAY 7, I OUTLINED THE PRINCIPLE ELEMENTS IN THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS. AS I NOTED THEN A U.S./SOVIET WORKING GROUP COMPLETED A PRELIMINARY JOINT DRAFT TEXT ON MAY 7 WHICH SHOWED LANGUAGE THAT HAD BEEN AGREED UP TO THAT POINT AND CLEARLY IDENTIFIED DIFFERENCES.

AS I MENTIONED TO YOU IN MY FEBRUARY 24 STATEMENT, THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED TO BAN IN THE NEW AGREEMENT A NUMBER OF SHSTEMS NOT CURRENTLY IN BEING. IN THIS CURRENT SESSION, BOTH SIDES HAVE NOW AGREED TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS: LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES CAPABLE OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE; BALLISTIC MISSILES CAPABLE OF RANGES IN EXCESS OF 600 KM ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES AND; INSTALLATIONS FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED, INCLUDING THE BEDS OF TERRITORIAL SEAS, THE OCEAN FLOOR, OR THE BEDS OF INTERNAL WATERS. IN THE CASE OF THESE SO-CALLED "SEABED" SYSTEMS, BOTH FIXED LAUNCHERS AND MOBILE LAUNCHERS THAT MOVE ONLY IN CONTACT WITH THE BOTTOM WOULD BE BANNED. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO INCLUDE CRUISE MISSILES IN THE LATTER TWO BANS. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO BAN ALL CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE, NOT JUST THOSE THAT ARE LAND-BASED AS WELL AS CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KM ON SUBMARINES. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THEIR POSITION CONTAINS NOTHING ON LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH RANGES BETWEEN 600 KM AND INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE. THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED TO INCLUDE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT A BAN ON SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO EARTH ORBIT, AS WELL AS BANNING FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM. SUCH A PROVISION WILL GO BEYOND THE PROHIBITION ON ACTUALLY PLACING SUCH WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE THAT IS CONTAINED IN THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY SINCE IT WILL BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF SYSTEMS THAT COULD CARRY THESE WEAPONS INTO EARTH ORBIT. THE TWO SIDES ARE PRESENTLY SEEKING

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MUTUALLY AGREEABLE LANGUAGE FOR IMPLEMENTING THESE BANS.

BOTH SIDES HAVE ALSO AGREED ON THE CONCEPT CARRIED OVER FROM THE INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT ICBM AND SLBM TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE AGGREGATE AND THAT THEIR NUMBER SHOULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED. THE U.S. IS ALSO INSISTING UPON CARRYING OVER FROM THE INERIM AGREEMENT THE APPLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTION TO TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS

FOR HEAVY ICBMS. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SILENT REGARDING THE
LAST QUESTION BUT HAVE PROPOSED THAT CONVERSION OF SPACE
VEHICLE LAUNCHERS INTO LAND-BASED ICBMS BE PROHIBITED.

BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO PROHIBIT LOCATING
EXTRA MISSILES IN ICBM LAUNCHER AREAS TOGETHER WITH EQUIPMENT
THAT WOULD GIVE A CAPABILITY FOR RAPID RELOADING OF FIXED ICBM
LAUNCHERS. THE U.S. PROPOSAL IS FRAMED SO AS TO COVER MOBILE
ICBM LAUNCHERS IF THEY ARE PERMITTED WHILE THE SOVIET VERSION
IS IN TERMS OF ONLY FIXED LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2772

INFO USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 339

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THE U.S. HAS ALSO MADE A PROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES OF THE
ONE I DISCUSSED WITH YOU ON MAY 7 FOR FOLLOW-ON TALKS ON FURTHER
LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND
SEEKS A COMMITMENT TO BEGIN THESE NEGOTIATIONS NO LATER
THAT ONE YEAR AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.
THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE FURTHER
LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS OF STRATEGIC ARMS AT THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE DATE. THE U.S. PROPOSAL ALSO STATES AS AN OBJECTIVE OF
THE SIDES CONCLUSION OF A FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT WELL IN ADVANCE OF
1985. THE SOVIETS RECENTLY MOVED FROM THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION
THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS

BEGIN NO LATER THAN 1980-1981 TO A POSITION THAT SUCH TALKS COULD BEGIN ANY TIME IN 1977. THEY ADDED THE STATEMENT THAT AT THESE TALKS THEY INTEND TO RAISE FBS AND "THE EXISTANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES."

IN RESPONSE TO INFORMAL SUGGESTIONS THAT I HAVE MADE TO HIM, MY SOVIET COLLEAGUE HAS RECENTLY INDICATED THAT PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THAT ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT COULD ENTER INTO FORCE UPON EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS RATHER THAN AWAIT THE EXPIRATION OF
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THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THIS REPRESENTS SOME MOVEMENT FROM THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION THAT THE AGREEMENT MERELY COVER THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 3, 1977 THROUGH 1985. WE HAVE AGREED THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A PRIOR UNDERSTANDING ON WHICH OF THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED UNDER THIS PRINCIPLE.

AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED HERE, THE SOVIETS, ON THE MORNING OF MAY 7, FINALLY ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF INCORPORATING SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS IN THE NEW AGREEMENT. IN THIS SESSION THERE HAS BEEN A PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED BY THE NEW AGREEMENT. THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DEFINITION OF AN ICBM, WHICH IS DEFINED TO BE A LAND-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN 5500 KSM, AND ON A DEFINITION FOR AN SLBM. THERE IS AGREEMENT WITHIN THE DEFINITIONS ARTICLE THAT HEAVY BOMBERS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE 2400 AGGREGATE BE SPECIFIED BY NAME AND THAT FUTURE AIRCRAFT COMPARABLE OR SUPERIOR TO THESE HEAVY BOMBERS SHALL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THEIR INCLUSION WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE. YOU WILL NOT BE SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT THUS FAR THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT AGREED TO THE INCLUSION OF THE BACKFIRE. FINALLY, AFTER EXTENSIVE AND RATHER TECHNICAL DISCUSSION THERE IS AGREEMENT IN SUBSTANCE ON A DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A MRIV SYSTEM. THIS PROVISION WILL CLEARLY DEFINE WHAT CONSTITUTES A MIRV AND WILL CLEARLY EXCLUDE MRVS. HOWEVER, WE ARE STILL WORKING ON AGREED LANGUAGE FOR THIS DEFINITION.

HAVING PROGRESSED SUBSTANTIALLY TOWARDS DEFINING THE SYSTEMS TO BE INCLUDED, THE TWO SIDES ALSO ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE RULES SPECIFYING WHEN AND HOW EACH SYSTEM WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE, A PROVISION I MENTIONED TO YOU ON MAY 7. THIS PROVISION INCLUDES NOT ONLY OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS, BUT ALSO SYSTEMS THAT ARE CLOSE TO BEING OPERATIONAL SUCH AS SYSTEMS IN RESERVE OR UNDER REPAIR. THERE IS ALSO AGREEMENT THAT FOR SYSTEMS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE LIMITATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT THEY MUST BE DISMANTLED, DESTROYED OR OTHERWISE DEALT WITH UNDER PROCEDURES TO BE AGREED UPON IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

ALTHOUGH NUMERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN, THERE HAS ALSO BEEN
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN AGREEING ON LANGUAGE FOR WHAT MIGHT BE
TERMED PERIPHERAL AND SUBSIDIARY MATTERS BUT I WILL NOT BURDEN
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YOU WITH WHAT ARE DETAILS WHICH CAN NEVERTHELESS BE TROUBLESOME
AND IMPORTANT. RATHER I WILL NOW TURN TO THE REMAINING
DIFFERENCES ON WHAT MIGHT BE TERMED IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

THE SOVIETS MAINTAIN THAT AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES OF ANY
TYPE ON HEAVY BOMBERS WITH A RANGE EXCEEDING 600 KM, INCLUDING
CRUISE MISSILES, SHOULD BE COUNTED WITHIN THE 2400 AGGREGATE
WHILE THE U.S. MAINTAINS THAT ONLY AIR-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC
MISSILES WITH SUCH A RANGE SHOULD BE SO COUNTED. FURTHER,
WHEREAS THE SOVIETS FORMERLY PROPOSED A BAN ON ALL AIR-TO
SURFACE MISSILES WITH SUCH A RANGE ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN
BOMBERS OF ANY TYPE, THEY NOW PROPOSE TO EXTEND THIS BAN TO ALL
AIRCRAFT EXCEPT HEAVY BOMBERS. TAKEN
TOGETHER WITH THE SOVIET POSITIONS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED
THE SOVIETS THUS PROPOSE TO BAN CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE
GREATER THAN 600KM EXCEPT ON HEAVY BOMBERS AND EXCEPT THOSE
THAT ARE LAND-BASED. OTHER THAN THE BAN I MENTIONED EARLIER ON
LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES THERE HAS BEEN
NO RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US ON CRUISE MISSILES.

WHILE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD BAN AIR-MOBILE ICBMS THE
SOVIETS HAVE NOT MENTIONED LAND-MOBILE ICBMS AT ANY TIME IN OUR
NEGOTIATIONS. THE U.S. DRAFT INCLUDES LAND-MOBILE WITHIN THE
AGGREGATES. THESE TWO MATTERS ARE OF COURSE RELATED BUT
HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0339

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

THE TWO SIDES ALSO CONTINUE TO DIFFER ON THE DEFINITION OF A HEAVY ICBM, WHICH THE U.S. CONTINUES TO PROPOSE BE ANY ICBM WITH A VOLUME OR THROW-WEIGHT GREATER THAN THAT OF THE SS-19. THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH THEY CONTINUE TO RESIST CONSIDERATION OF THROW-WEIGHT AS AN ELEMENT IN ANY SUCH DEFINITION, NOW SEEM SOMEWHAT LESS RESISTANT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE BE SUCH A DEFINITION. PREVIOUSLY, AS YOU RECALL, THEY WERE UNWILLING TO CONSIDER ANYTHING BEYOND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVISION ON THE CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR LIGHT ICBM'S TO LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY ICBM'S ALONG WITH THE RELATED LIMITATION ON INCREASES IN LAUNCHER SIZE.

AS FAR AS BACKFIRE IS CONCERNED, THE SOVIETS SIMPLY MAINTAIN THAT BACKFIRE IS A MEDIUM BOMBER BUT PROVIDE NO RATIONALE FOR THIS POSITION. THEY ALLEGE THAT OUR STATED ASSESSMENTS OF THE BACKFIRE'S RANGE AND PAYLOAD REPRESENT SIMPLY AN EFFORT TO TRAP THEM INTO REVEALING THE AIRCRAFT'S ACTUAL CAPABILITIES.

THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF MIRV VERIFICATION CONTINUES TO BE UNRESOLVED, ALTHOUGH AS YOU HAVE SEEN THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN ADDRESSED AT SENIOR LEVELS OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

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A RELATED ISSUE IS THE ASSURANCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS TO VERIFY ALL RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. WHILE BOTH SIDES ARE AGREED THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT MUST BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND THAT SUCH MEANS MUST NOT BE INTERFERED WITH, THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED A PROVISION PROVIDING THAT THE PARTIES WILL NOT USE ANY MEASURE OR PRACTICE WHICH DELIBERATELY IMPEDES VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE SOVIETS HAVE ARGUED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT BANNING DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES ARE SUFFICIENT. THE DISAGREEMENT IN THIS AREA CENTERS AROUND OUR INSISTENCE THAT THERE BE A SPECIFIC SPELLING OUT OF WHAT IS MEANT BY THE TERM "DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES."

FINALLY, THE ISSUES OF NON-TRANSFER AND OF THE SO-CALLED FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS REMAIN. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE FEB. 1 SOVIET DRAFT TEXT CONTAINED A PROVISION THAT THE SIDES SHOULD "IN THE NEAR FUTURE" CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF REDUCING SO-CALLED FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS QUESTIONS "RELATED TO THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES." RECENTLY, WHILE CONTINUING TO STRESS THEIR CONCERN OVER THESE ISSUES THE SOVIETS HAVE CHANGED THEIR APPROACH. THEY WITHDREW FROM THE DRAFT TEXT THE PROVISION CONTAINED IN THEIR FEB. 1 DRAFT AND PROPOSED WHAT THEY CALL A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION. THIS PROVISION CALLS ON THE PARTIES NOT TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT'S PROVISIONS "THROUGH A THIRD STATE" OR "IN ANY OTHER MANNER." THE SOVIETS PROPOSE THAT SUCH A PROVISION BE ACCOMPANIED BY A UNILATERAL U.S. STATEMENT THAT THE US WILL NOT "BUILD UP" FBS "BUT WILL ALSO UNDERTAKE" TO REDUCE SUCH SYSTEMS. AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY NOTED THE SOVIETS ALSO HAVE SAID THEY INTEND TO RAISE FBS AND THE "EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES" AT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR FURTHER LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS. THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN UNCHANGED THEIR NON-TRANSFER PROPOSAL. I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT DISCUSSING FBS OR "NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES". I HAVE ALSO CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO DISCUSS NON-TRANSFER.

THIS CONCLUDES MY FORMAL PRESENTATION AND I WILL BE GLAD TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE..JOHNSON

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